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How to Combat Prenatal Substance Abuse 
While Also Protecting Pregnant Women: A 
Legislative Proposal to Create an Appropriate 
Balance∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
“Substance abuse in pregnancy is associated with a number 
of adverse outcomes for the woman, fetus, and neonate.”1  A 
recent study indicated that approximately 5.9% of pregnant 
women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four use illicit 
drugs.2  Prenatal illicit drug use has escalated over the past 
decade, causing an increase in “maternal and neonatal 
complications, neonatal abstinence syndrome, and health care 
costs.”3  Following alcohol and marijuana, methamphetamine is 
the most commonly abused drug.4  By 2006, admissions for 
treatment of methamphetamine abuse among pregnant women 
∗ 	The author thanks the Arkansas Law Review editors for their tremendous work and
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Killenbeck, University of Arkansas School of Law, along with his Note and Comment
Group, Caleb Lang, Joseph Hout, Ron Johnson, and Bailey Knapp for their guidance
throughout the writing process.  Lastly, the author thanks Brian Johnston, Caitlin Kenner,
and his parents for their time and assistance in developing the article.
1. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, Position Statement:
Criminalization of Pregnant Women with Substance Abuse Disorders, 44 J. OBSTETRIC 
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 155, 155 (2015). 
2. Id.
3. Id.  In analyzing various studies, the findings of prenatal methamphetamine use is
consistently associated with small-for-gestational-age (SGA) infants and low birth weight 
babies, and it “appears to be associated with neonatal and childhood neurodevelopmental 
abnormalities.”  COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, AM. COLL. OF 
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP. NO. 479, METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE IN 
WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE 2-3 (2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co479.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8R3P-7SWG]. 
4. COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, supra note 3, at 1.
However, women who use methamphetamine often do not begin and end with 
methamphetamine but also “frequently use tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs, which may 
confound the birth outcomes.”  Id. at 2. 
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had increased to twenty-four percent of federally-funded 
treatment admissions, up from eight percent in 1994.5 
For years, states have attempted to combat this growing 
national issue by punishing women through existing drug 
prohibition statutes.6  There are generally three rationales 
favoring the prosecution of pregnant women using controlled 
substances:  deterrence, retribution, and improving maternal or 
fetal health.7  Support for fetal abuse prosecutions assert that the 
“unaborted fetuses have a future interest in their well-being” and 
potentially dangerous maternal actions or omissions should, 
therefore, be prosecuted.8  Those in favor of prosecution also 
contend that, although parents have discretion in how to raise 
their children, parents have a moral and legal obligation not to 
endanger their children; in this instance, prenatal drug use 
injures the child before birth.9  Further, proponents believe that 
actual arrest, prosecution, incarceration, or the threat of one 
“will deter pregnant women from abusing drugs or alcohol,” 
thus ensuring “safer pregnancies and better birth outcomes.”10 
However, women’s rights advocates and most in the 
medical field, such as the Association of Women’s Health, 
Obstetric, and Neonatal Nurses (AWHONN), do not “support 
laws that single out pregnant women” or laws that punish 
pregnant women more severely or differently than other 
5. Id. at 1.
6. Alisha Marano, Note, Punishing Is Helping: An Analysis of the Implications of Ex
Parte Ankrom and How the Intervention of the Criminal Justice System Is a Step in the 
Right Direction Toward Combating the National Drug Problem and Protecting the 
“Child”, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 113, 115 (2013). 
7. Krista Stone-Manista, Comment, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to
Successfully Challenging Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 832-33 (2009).
8. Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Comment, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal
Status for Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1258 
(1998); Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 836 (referencing the argument that “monitoring or 
imprisoning pregnant women . . . will lead to improved maternal or fetal health 
outcomes.”). 
9. Kowalski, supra note 8; Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 834 (explaining that the
criminal justice theory of retribution believes that one who commits a morally or legally 
wrongful act should be held accountable).   
10. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1, at 155;
Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 833 (stating that the “prosecution-as-deterrence” argues 
that if women know that prenatal illicit drug use may lead to imprisonment, then women 
would cease in their controlled substance use). 
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individuals that use illicit drugs.11  Their argument is that such 
laws are an ineffective strategy for reducing prenatal substance 
abuse because the women often suffer from an addiction—”a 
chronic, relapsing disease”—and the fear of facing punitive 
action or being reported to law enforcement tends “to deter 
women from seeking prenatal care that can provide them access 
to appropriate counseling, referral, and monitoring.”12  In the 
late 1980s, it was difficult for pregnant women to find a 
rehabilitation program that was willing to work with them.13  
Though pregnant women appear to have more options available 
to them now, the consequences of enrolling are not clear.14  
Further, there are constitutional and social concerns when it 
comes to prosecuting prenatal illicit drug use.15 
On November 1, 2012, Melissa McCann Arms went into 
labor, and, later, while still in labor, tested positive for 
methamphetamine.16  After birth, the toxicology reports showed 
that her baby also tested positive for multiple drugs, including 
methamphetamine.17  One nurse testified that while the child 
was in the nursery he exhibited signs consistent with 
11. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1; see also
Rachel Carlson, Comment, A Gap in the Criminal Justice System, Creating a New Class of 
Felons in Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, A State-by-State Analysis, 83 MISS. L.J. 71, 88, 
91 (2014) (arguing that “punish[ing] women because they are addicted to drugs and happen 
to be pregnant” conflicts with equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment 
issues, and wrongfully “creat[es] a new class of criminals and a new crime, resulting in an 
entirely new class of felons.”). 
12. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1, at 155-56.
13. Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 833.
14. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1445 (1991). 
15. Meghan Horn, Note, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and Policy
Problems with Prosecutions for Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 635, 642-49 (2008) (discussing the three primary categories of constitutional 
issues with criminal prosecutions:  procedural due process and vagueness, substantive due 
process and privacy, and equal protection).  A recent study indicated that prosecutions for 
prenatal drug use tend to target minority or disadvantaged populations.  Lynn M. Paltrow 
& Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United 
States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 311 (2013).  The study discovered that women who were 
economically disadvantaged were significantly more likely to be prosecuted—seventy-one 
percent of the women qualified for indigent defense.  Id.  Moreover, there was a noticeable 
racial disparity in that fifty-nine percent of women prosecuted in this study were women of 
color.  Id.   
16. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-4, 471 S.W.3d 637, 640.
17. Id. at 4, 471 S.W.3d at 640.
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methamphetamine withdrawal.18  As a result of her son testing 
positive for a controlled substance at birth, Arms lost custody of 
her child through dependency-neglect.19  Although Arms 
successfully completed drug rehabilitation, counseling, 
parenting courses, and various 12-step programs in an effort to 
get her child back in her dependency-neglect case, she was 
criminally prosecuted in 2014.20  At her criminal trial, a jury 
found Arms guilty of a felony for introducing a controlled 
substance into the body of another person and sentenced her to 
20 years.21 
In reversing Melissa Arms’ conviction, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that (1) a fetus was not a person for 
purposes of the statute; and (2) there was not substantial 
evidence that there was a transfer of the controlled substance 
after birth to support the verdict.22  Despite this, the prosecutor 
in the Arms case has successfully prosecuted two more women 
under the same introduction-of-a-controlled-substance statute as 
he did with Arms23 and stated that he intends to continue 
bringing cases using this statute.24  Following Arms’ reversal, 
the Arkansas Attorney General stated that her office is 
“committed to working with the General Assembly to clarify 
18. Id.
19. Olga Khazan, Freedom for a Woman Who Got 20 Years for Using Meth While
Pregnant, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/10/a-pregnant-drug-users-conviction-
overturned/409867/ [https://perma.cc/9FMZ-8H9M]; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 
(2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(ix)(b)(B)(i)(a) (2015) (stating that “neglect” 
includes “[c]ausing a child to be born with an illegal substance present in the child’s bodily 
fluids or bodily substances”). 
20. Khazan, supra note 19.
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-2109(a) (2015); Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1, 471
S.W.3d at 639. 
22. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 6-8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
23. Melanie Buck, Arms Case Overturned by Arkansas Supreme Court,
MYPULSENEWS (Oct. 10, 2015), http://mypulsenews.com/arms-case-overturned-by-
arkansas-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/6SGS-L2D4].  Following the Arms decision, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted two separate 
federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus, vacating the respective defendants’ convictions 
and sentences and ordering immediate release.  See Robertson v. Kelley, No. 5:16-cv-
00185-KGB/JTR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89418 (E.D. Ark. July 11, 2016); Blankenship v. 
Kelley, No. 5:16-cv-00005-BD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 28, 2016). 
24. See Melissa Jeltsen, Relief for Woman Sentenced to 20 Years for Using Meth
While Pregnant, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/melissa-mccann-arms-sentence-
reversed_561bbb8fe4b0e66ad4c872f1 [https://perma.cc/9DTZ-RDSB].  
2017] PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE 171
that this statute makes it a crime for a pregnant woman to 
introduce controlled substances like methamphetamine into the 
body of her unborn or just born child.”25  Until the Arkansas 
General Assembly modifies this particular statute, it is clear a 
fetus is not a person.  However, there remains uncertainty in 
Arkansas following the Arms case and public statements by the 
state as to whether a woman can be charged or convicted under 
such statutes based on a transfer through the umbilical cord once 
there is a live birth. 
This Comment examines whether a state can prosecute 
women for prenatal use of illicit substances under introduction 
of a controlled substance, child abuse, and child neglect statutes.  
Part II discusses an analysis of Arkansas’s first case of this kind, 
Arms v. State.26  Part III surveys the various approaches other 
jurisdictions have taken in either criminalizing such conduct or 
refusing to enforce these types of criminal statues against 
pregnant women.  Part IV examines statutory and common law 
issues left open following the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
opinion.  Finally, Part V suggests a proposed solution for 
Arkansas and other states that are considering how to best 
approach the issue of prenatal controlled substance use.  This 
Comment does not discuss the public policy arguments for or 
against criminalization of prenatal drug use that have been 
extensively covered by other authors.27  As a result, the main 
25. See Buck, supra note 23.  Although the facts in Arms technically fall within the
introduction of a controlled substance statute parameters, it is unlikely that the legislature 
intended the statute to be applied to in utero transfers.  McCann-Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 
App. 27, at 11, 453 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Whiteaker, J., concurring), vacated, Arms v. State, 
2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637.  “If the [Arkansas] legislature does in fact intend this 
statute to apply to an in utero transfer of a controlled substance from a mother to her child, 
it should amend the statute to make its intent patently clear.”  Id. 
26. 2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637.
27. For more in-depth analysis of public policy and proper remedy arguments, see
generally Louise Marlane Chan, Note, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York 
Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199 
(1993) (arguing that criminal intervention, along with education and treatment is the best 
remedy for addressing prenatal drug use problems); Elizabeth E. Coleman & Monica K. 
Miller, Assessing Legal Responses to Prenatal Drug Use: Can Therapeutic Responses 
Produce More Positive Outcomes Than Punitive Responses, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 35 (2006) 
(discussing the effects of prenatal drug use on society, dangers of prosecuting under 
preexisting laws, and advocating for non-punitive avenues to handle prenatal substance 
abuse); Kowalski, supra note 8 (advancing three different models for prenatal abuse 
prosecution); Marano, supra note 6 (discussing Alabama’s public policy decision to protect 
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discussion is whether it is possible for a state to prosecute 
women at all under these types of statutes and to propose a 
statutory solution to cure the current ambiguity. 
II. EXAMINING ARMS V. STATE
In 2014, a jury convicted Melissa Arms of introducing a 
controlled substance into the body of another person and 
sentenced her to twenty years in prison.28  The state charged 
Melissa Arms after she gave birth to a baby that tested positive 
for methamphetamine and other illegal substances.29  Although 
Melissa Arms originally denied any drug use, she later admitted 
that she had used methamphetamine at least four times while 
pregnant—including as recent as the day before delivery.30  The 
relevant statute provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to 
administer or cause to be ingested, inhaled, or otherwise 
introduced into the human body of another person a controlled 
substance.”31 
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in reversing Melissa Arms’ 
conviction, first found that the statute’s use of  “person” made 
no mention of a fetus or unborn child.32  Further, the Arkansas 
Code “expressly limits criminalizing conduct with respect to an 
unborn child to homicide offenses,” and it “does not allow a 
mother to be charged or convicted of any homicide offense 
while her child is in utero.”33  Consequently, the court held that 
Arms could not be convicted for a transfer while the child was in 
utero.34  Therefore, the sole criminalizing behavior could have 
life, whether it be unborn or born life); Stone-Manista, supra note 7 (noting both public 
policy arguments for and against prosecuting women in prenatal abuse instances). 
28. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1-2, 471 S.W.3d at 639.
29. Id. at 2, 4, 471 S.W.3d at 639-40.
30. Id. at 3-5, 471 S.W.3d at 640-41.
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2015).
32. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 6, 471 S.W.3d at 642.  As evidenced in multiple
Arkansas statutes including an unborn child as a person, “when the legislature intends to 
include ‘unborn child’ within the definition of ‘person,’ or it intends to afford protection to 
unborn children, it expressly does so in the statute.”  Id. at 10, 471 S.W.3d at 644 (Brill, 
C.J., concurring).  “The [Arkansas] legislature has chosen not to include ‘unborn child’
within the definition of ‘person’ for the purposes of section 5-13-210(b) . . . [I]t is the
legislature, not the court, that determines the kind of conduct that constitutes a crime.”  Id.
at 11, 471 S.W.3d at 644.
33. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
34. Id.
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only occurred within the “narrow window of time when the 
child was outside the womb, but still attached to the placenta by 
the umbilical cord.”35 
The registered nurse who performed the delivery testified 
that after Arms’ baby was born and outside of the womb, the 
umbilical cord remained attached for a brief period between a 
few seconds and few minutes.36  However, the court determined 
that “the record [wa]s completely devoid of any evidence that 
Arms directly introduced methamphetamine into her baby’s 
system.”37  More specifically, there was a lack of evidence 
proving “an ongoing transfer of the methamphetamine that was 
in Arms’s system after the child was born.”38  The jury, 
therefore, would have had to speculate that Arms introduced the 
methamphetamine into the baby’s body after birth and that a 
“verdict [] not supported by substantial evidence” must be 
reversed and dismissed.39  This left open the possibility of 
successful prosecutions under the statute so long as the state 
introduces substantial evidence of the postpartum transfer. 
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL DRUG USE
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
The issue in Arms v. State was a case of first impression in 
Arkansas,40 and although Melissa Arms’ conviction was 
35. Id.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals determined that, even assuming the statute
does not define a fetus as a person, Arms was not entitled to reversal: 
Although there is no specific evidence before [the court] to indicate the exact 
time that [Arms’] newborn child’s umbilical cord was cut following his birth, 
there was some amount of time that passed between the child’s birth and its 
detachment from the umbilical cord through which he received nutrients and 
fluids from [Arms]. 
McCann-Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 27, at 10, 453 S.W.3d 709, 714.  Therefore, once 
the child was born, he “undoubtedly was ‘another person’ suffering from withdrawal from 
methamphetamine, which [Arms] caused him to ingest or otherwise introduced to him.” 
Id. at 10, 453 S.W.3d at 715. 
36. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-4, 471 S.W.3d at 640.
37. Id. at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 7-8, 471 S.W.3d at 642 (citing Pridgett v. State, 276 Ark. 52, 54, 631
S.W.2d 833, 834 (1982)). 
40. However, it is worth noting that the Arkansas Supreme Court previously
overruled a trial court’s order that an unborn fetus was dependent-neglected, thus placing 
the unborn fetus in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services.  Ark. 
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ultimately overturned, prosecutors in other jurisdictions have 
attempted to combat various forms of substance abuse during 
pregnancy by bringing criminal actions against mothers under 
these types of cases for nearly twenty-five years.41  In fact, some 
states have successfully prosecuted women for similar 
offenses.42  The primary theories used by prosecutors are (1) 
introducing a controlled substance;43 and (2) child abuse, 
neglect, or endangerment statutes.44 
A. Use of Existing “Delivery” Statutes for Prenatal
Drug Use Prosecution 
Several states have prosecuted women for prenatal drug use 
through existing statutes that prohibit introduction of a 
controlled substance into the body of another person—also 
known as delivery statutes.45  These statutes have not been 
amended to include the term fetus but have still resulted in 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 515-17, 95 S.W.3d 772, 777-78 (2003). 
The court found that the term “juvenile” did not encompass an unborn fetus.  Id. at 518, 95 
S.W.3d at 778-79.  It also did not find the state’s argument persuasive that “Amendment 68 
to the Arkansas Constitution, which establishes a public policy to protect the life of every 
unborn child” required amending the legislature’s statutory definition of a juvenile.  Id. at 
522-23, 95 S.W.3d at 781; see also ARK. CONST. amend. LXVIII, § 2.
41. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642-43; Tony A. Kordus, Comment,
Did South Carolina Really Protect the Fetus by Imposing Criminal Sanctions on a Woman 
for Ingesting Cocaine During Her Pregnancy in Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1999 WL 
393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996)?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 319, 320 (1997). 
42. See, e.g., Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 377 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Whitner
v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-83 (S.C. 1997).
43. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (declining to
enforce the criminal prosecution of a woman for prenatal illicit drug consumption under a 
delivery statute); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the 
legislature did not mean to include prenatal transmission of controlled substances to a 
fetus); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that 
prenatal use of cocaine, perhaps resulting in postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites was 
not intended to be prosecuted under a delivery-of-cocaine statute). 
44. See Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 375, 377 (affirming a guilty plea for chemical
endangerment of a child); Reinesto v. Super. Ct., 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) 
(declining to apply a child abuse statute for prenatal heroin use); State v. Armstard, 991 So. 
2d 116, 124 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding the legislature did not intend the statute for 
mistreatment or neglect to include prenatal drug or alcohol use); In re Baby Boy 
Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a newborn’s positive 
toxicology test “for an illegal drug due to prenatal maternal drug abuse” is per se child 
abuse); Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778 (holding that a viable fetus falls under the term “child” 
in the child abuse and endangerment statute). 
45. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290-91; Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33; Hardy, 469
N.W.2d at 51-52. 
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convictions.  On appellate review, these convictions have been 
reversed.46 
Jennifer Johnson, a Florida resident, was the first woman to 
face prosecution for her prenatal drug use after she exposed her 
newborn children to cocaine in two different instances.47  First, 
Johnson admitted that she had used cocaine the night before her 
son was born, and the child tested positive for “a metabolite or 
‘breakdown’ product of cocaine.”48  Then, when Johnson’s 
daughter was born over a year later, Johnson admitted to 
smoking marijuana and using cocaine frequently throughout her 
entire pregnancy.49  Consequently, Johnson was convicted on 
two counts for delivering a controlled substance to a minor.50 
The prosecution theorized that, as a result of her voluntary 
drug use, Johnson delivered cocaine, or a breakdown of the 
substance, to the children “via blood flowing through the 
children’s umbilical cords” during the “sixty-to-ninety second 
period after they were expelled from her birth canal but before 
their cords were severed.”51  The Florida Supreme Court, in 
reversing Johnson’s conviction, stated that the Florida 
Legislature did not intend to “encompass ‘delivery’ of an illegal 
drug derivative from womb to placenta to umbilical cord to 
newborn after a child’s birth.”52  Following the Johnson case, 
many other states agreed with the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision that “delivery” statutes were not applicable to prenatal 
drug use.53 
In another example, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed 
a trial court’s dismissal of delivering a controlled substance 
charge against a woman for her prenatal drug use.54  Although 
the Luster court conceded that once the child was born it became 
a person, for purposes of an indictment, “at the time any transfer 
46. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296-97; Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33; Hardy, 469
N.W.2d at 52. 
47. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290-91; see also Coleman & Miller, supra note 27, at
43. 
48. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1291.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1290-91.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. at 1296-97.
53. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469
N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). 
54. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33.
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of cocaine metabolites could have taken place” the fetus was not 
a person for purposes of the statute as intended by the 
legislature.55 
Similarly, the state charged a woman in Michigan with 
“delivery of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing 
cocaine” when her child’s urine tested positive for cocaine 
metabolites, and she admitted smoking crack “less than thirteen 
hours before giving birth.”56  The prosecutor asserted the theory 
that once the defendant ingested the cocaine, it was “transmitted 
from [the] defendant’s system through the umbilical cord during 
the period after the baby had passed through the birth canal until 
the umbilical cord was severed.”57  Further, an expert in 
neonatology testified that it was “highly probable that finite 
amount[s] of cocaine were moving through the umbilical cord” 
between the mother and child prior to the umbilical cord being 
clamped.58  However, the court reversed the district court’s 
refusal to quash the delivery of cocaine charge because it did not 
believe the legislature intended to prosecute women for drug use 
that may result in the transfer of metabolites via the umbilical 
cord.59 
B. Use of Existing Child Abuse and Child
Endangerment Statutes for Prenatal Drug Use 
Prosecutions 
1. Jurisdictions Where Appellate Courts Have
Affirmed Convictions 
The most successful criminal prosecutions for prenatal 
controlled substance use have been brought under existing child 
abuse or child endangerment statutes.60  While these statutes 
have not been modified to specifically include the term “fetus,” 
the convictions have been affirmed on appeal.  South Carolina 
was the first state to uphold a criminal conviction for prenatal 
55. Id. at 34.
56. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 51.
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id. at 53.
60. Carlson, supra note 11, at 83; see e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-84
(S.C. 1997); In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 845-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Ankrom 
v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
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drug use under a child endangerment statute.61  In Whitner, the 
defendant, Cornelia Whitner, pled guilty to criminal child 
neglect after ingesting cocaine and causing her child to be born 
with cocaine metabolites in the child’s system.62  The South 
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that a fetus was a person 
under the applicable statute and that the state’s policy of 
protecting children supported the court’s interpretation.63  
Additionally, the court stated that because “it is common 
knowledge that use of cocaine during pregnancy can harm the 
viable unborn child,” the defendant had “all the notice the 
Constitution requires.”64  Finally, the court found that Whitner’s 
right to privacy, specifically to carry her pregnancy to term, was 
not violated because cocaine use is illegal and cannot be placed 
“to the lofty status of a fundamental right.”65 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed another woman’s 
conviction when she abused drugs during her pregnancy, and as 
a result, her child was delivered prematurely and suffered 
withdrawal symptoms.66  The court reasoned that to accept the 
mother’s argument that a fetus is not a child, would mean that 
“harm to a child knowingly inflicted before birth cannot be harm 
to, or abuse of, a child.”67  This would ignore the legislative 
intent and statutory language to ensure “care, protection, and 
wholesome moral, mental and physical development of 
children.”68  Moreover, the court found that the Tennessee 
statute, along with common law precedent, “clearly establishes 
that a parent may be held responsible for the prenatal conduct 
that exposes the child, once born, to great bodily harm.”69 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reached a similar 
result finding a woman guilty for chemical endangerment of a 
child for the mother’s ingestion of illegal substances during 
pregnancy, resulting in the infant testing positive for the 
61. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-84; Kordus, supra note 41, at 320-21.
62. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
63. Id. at 780-81.
64. Id. at 785.
65. Id. at 786.
66. In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 845-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
67. Id. at 849 (emphasis omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 847.
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controlled substance at birth.70  Hope Elizabeth Ankrom, the 
mother, argued that the term “child” did not include a viable 
fetus.71  Rejecting this theory, the court found that the word 
“child” was unambiguous, reasoning that “child” applied to a 
viable fetus in other contexts, the dictionary definition of “child” 
includes a fetus, and it is common in everyday use for “someone 
to state that a mother is pregnant with her first ‘child.’”72  
Further, the court explained that their ruling was supported by 
the public policy of Alabama, as stated by the Alabama 
Legislature.73 
2. Jurisdictions Reversing Convictions
Although prosecutions under child abuse or endangerment 
statues have been upheld in a few states, many jurisdictions have 
reached contrary decisions where the legislature has yet to 
amend the statutes to include a “fetus.”  Some courts find 
extending such statutes in order to prosecute women for prenatal 
drug use is against legislative intent.74  For example, some have 
held that prenatal drug use is not an activity foreseen by the 
legislature when creating the statute.75  Other jurisdictions 
concluded that a fetus is not a person under their state’s statute.76  
In most of these cases, courts held that it was up to the state’s 
legislature to include an unborn fetus in the definition of “child” 
if its intent was to include it.77 
A Nevada mother, Cathy Encoe, faced charges for child 
endangerment after she admitted to marijuana use during her 
pregnancy.78  Then, following hospital protocol, her newborn 
70. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
71. Id. at 382.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 379 (stating that Alabama’s public policy “is to protect life, born, and
unborn” and especially “concerning unborn life that is capable of living outside the 
womb.”). 
74. Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994).
75. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 314 (Md. 2006) (reasoning that “the
overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have concluded that those 
crimes do not encompass that kind of activity.”). 
76. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 532-33 (N.D. 2013).
77. Reyes v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino Cty., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (stating “when the [l]egislature has intended to include a fetus or unborn 
child within the protection of a penal statute, it has done so expressly.”). 
78. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 597.
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was tested and found positive for amphetamines and 
methamphetamine.79  The state acknowledged that a fetus was 
not a person under the statute, but contended that “Encoe 
violated the statute from the moment her child left the womb to 
the moment the umbilical cord was severed”; thereby reasoning 
the passage of methamphetamine after birth while the umbilical 
cord was still connected constituted endangerment.80  Notably, 
that was the precise argument raised in the Arkansas case, Arms 
v. State, without success.81
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the endangerment 
statute does not include prenatal ingestion of controlled 
substances and the transmission of the substances via the 
umbilical cord.82  Further, “[a] person may not be punished for a 
crime unless her acts fall clearly within the language of the 
statute” and other courts have similarly found such “construction 
renders the statute impermissibly vague.”83  The court also stated 
that this kind of prosecution “would open the floodgates to 
prosecution of pregnant women who ingest such things as 
alcohol, nicotine, and a range of miscellaneous, otherwise legal, 
toxins.”84 
In State v. Stegall, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
addressed three separate cases in which women engaged in 
prenatal methamphetamine use, and, after giving birth, the 
children all tested positive for the substance.85  North Dakota 
prosecuted their conduct under the theory of endangerment 
contending that the prenatal action of “each defendant continued 
to affect her child postpartum” and that “a child is still ‘exposed’ 
to the controlled substance following birth” despite the fact the 
substance use took place before the birth of the child.86  The 
79. Id.
80. Id. at 598.
81. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 5, 471 S.W.3d 637, 641.
82. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 599.
83. Id. at 598; see also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992); People
v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 712-
13 (Ohio 1992).
84. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 598 (stating that the legislature is the better forum to discuss
public policy issues, such effects of, and criminalization of, prenatal drug use). 
85. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 528-29 (N.D. 2013).
86. Id. at 529-530; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-22.2(2) (West 2003)
(criminalizing when one “knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child . . . to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance”). 
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court held that “an unborn viable fetus is not a child under the 
endangerment of a child statute,” and, consequently, “a pregnant 
woman is not criminally liable for endangerment of a child for 
prenatal conduct that ultimately harms a child born alive.”87  
Also, the court noted that if “the [state] legislature had expressly 
intended to criminalize endangerment of a child to include an 
unborn child it would have done so.”88 
C. States with Statutes Specifically Criminalizing
Prenatal Drug Use 
In 2014, Tennessee passed a statute making the fetus a 
victim for purposes of assault and homicide statutes.89  Under 
this statute, “‘another,’ ‘individuals,’ and ‘another person’ 
include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in 
utero,” when such terms refer to a victim of a criminal act.90  
The state legislature made a point to include that “nothing in this 
section shall preclude prosecution of a woman for assault” for 
prenatal narcotic drug use “if her child is born addicted to or 
harmed by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result 
of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.”91  
There is, however, an affirmative defense if one “actively 
enrolled in an addiction recovery program before the child is 
born, remained in the program after delivery, and successfully 
completed the program.”92  The current version of the statute 
only remained in effect until 2016, allowing lawmakers to assess 
the law’s impact before extending the law or passing another 
similar statute.93 
87. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d at 533.
88. Id. at 531.
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (West 2014).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(a) (West 2014).
91. See Act of Apr. 29, 2014, 2014 Tenn. L. Pub., ch. 820; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-101(a)(1) (West 2016) (stating that assault occurs when one “[i]ntentionally, knowingly
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another”).
92. Act of Apr. 29, 2014, 2014 Tenn. L. Pub., ch. 820.
93. Amanda Sakuma, Tenn. Passes Law Criminalizing Moms Who Used Drugs
While Pregnant, MSNBC (Apr. 30, 2014, 7:06 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/tennessee-passes-law-criminalize-moms-drugs
[https://perma.cc/Z3GN-YWXL].  In the spring of 2016, it was determined that this law
would not be renewed.  See Sheila Burke, Doctors Are Applauding the End of a Unique
Tennessee Law Threatening Addicted Mothers with Jail for Assault if They Gave Birth to
Babies with Drug Dependence, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016 5:49 PM),
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IV. UNRESOLVED LEGAL ISSUES
FOLLOWING ARMS V. STATE
As discussed in previous sections, opinions are split among 
jurisdictions on the prosecution of mothers for their prenatal 
drug use.94  Aligning with other states, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court determined that an unborn fetus did not constitute a 
person for purposes of the statute in the Arms case, but perhaps 
left the door open for prosecution of other mothers under the 
statute as written.95  The court found that the umbilical cord 
transfer failed for lack of sufficient evidence, suggesting that 
had there been sufficient evidence after birth, a conviction may 
have been possible.96  Further, the court also opened up the 
debate as to whether the mother’s actions in these situations is 
an active or passive function.97 
A. Is It Possible to Obtain Substantial Evidence to
Convict? 
The medical field has extensively researched whether 
controlled substances are transferred across the placenta from a 
pregnant woman to an unborn fetus and child after birth.98  For 
example, chemical products from marijuana—the most common 
illicit substance used during pregnancy—have been found to 
transfer through the placenta and into breast milk.99  Also, there 
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-04-01/doctors-applaud-the-end-of-
tennessees-fetal-assault-law [https://perma.cc/C3FL-ZCP9]. 
94. See Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 372, 382-85 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Johnson v.
State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294-96 (Fla. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52-53 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780-84 (S.C. 1997).   
95. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d 637, 637, 642; see id. at 13-14,
471 S.W.3d at 645-646 (Wood, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s comments “that 
section 5-13-210 could never include the transfer of a controlled substance through a 
passive bodily function” were “purely advisory” because no party raised that argument at 
trial).  The Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it will not address an issue not 
raised and ruled on at trial “and to otherwise would be to issue an advisory opinion, which 
we will not do.”  Id. 
96. Id. at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
97. Id. at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
98. See Grace Chang, Overview of Substance Misuse in Pregnant Women,
UPTODATE (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/overview-of-substance-
misuse-in-pregnant-
women?source=machineLearning&search=prenatal+drug+use&selectedTitle=1~150&secti
onRank=1&anchor=H96352822#H96352822 [https://perma.cc/9A79-HXGM]. 
99. Id.
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is evidence that “[c]ocaine readily crosses the placenta and fetal 
blood-brain barrier.”100  Methamphetamine, which was used by 
Melissa Arms, and its byproducts are also known to cross the 
placenta.101 
Although there is evidence that a transfer of a controlled 
substance occurs at some point, hence infants testing positive for 
illegal drugs at birth, it is difficult to determine exactly when the 
exposure happens.102  Urine screening, as used in Arms’ case, 
presents a relatively short window of exposure, typically 
reflecting only days.103  Meconium analysis allows testing for 
specific drugs through fetal excrement; however, this “testing is 
not typically available on-site at birth hospitals, and results from 
outside reference laboratories are often not readily available.”104  
It can also be quite challenging to collect appropriate samples of 
meconium because, for instance, meconium may be passed in 
utero or become contaminated with transitional human milk or 
formula stools.105  A promising approach is the “[t]esting of 
umbilical cord blood and tissue by using drug class-specific 
immunoassays”; however, this method is not available for 
clinical use at the moment.106  Although there are several 
effective methods of testing for controlled substance use, 
specifically, testing of the umbilical cord after birth—avoiding 
the debate about whether a fetus is a person for purposes of 
these statutes—“the question of how recent maternal drug 
ingestion must be in order to be detected . . . has not been 
settled.”107 
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-5, 471 S.W.3d at 640-41.
102. See Suzanne D’Amico, Comment, Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and
Neglect: A Gender-Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 855, 862 (2001). 
103. See Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3, 471 S.W.3d at 640; Lauren M. Jansson, Infants
of Mothers with Substance Use Disorder, UPTODATE (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/infants-of-mothers-with-substance-
abuse?source=machineLearning&search=Infants+of+mothers+with+substance+abuse&sel
ectedTitle=1~150&sectionRank=1&anchor=H24#H24 [https://perma.cc/S9TU-UKDG].  
104. Jansson, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. D. Montgomery et al., Testing for Fetal Exposure to Illicit Drugs Using
Umbilical Cord Tissue vs Meconium, 26 J. PERINATOLOGY 11, 13 (2006) (stating that 
pregnant animal studies “illustrate[] the complexity of this issue.”). 
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Few courts have discussed whether the brief time after birth 
that the umbilical cord is connected to the mother and child 
constitutes enough evidence to convict a mother under delivery 
statutes, since during this period it is indisputable that the baby 
is a “person,” eliminating the argument that a fetus is not a 
person.  In Johnson, the judge reversed a mother’s conviction 
for lack of evidence because there was no testimony establishing 
“that any cocaine derivatives passed from the mother’s womb to 
the placenta during the sixty-to-ninety seconds” after the child 
was born.108 
Although modern science can gather evidence to determine 
whether or not a baby receives a controlled substance through 
the placenta and umbilical cord from the mother, it is not 
sufficient to accurately pinpoint when the transfer occurs.109  
Therefore, the only time frame to collect evidence in order to 
convict a mother under a delivery statute—where a fetus is not 
yet a person—is “the narrow window of time when the child [is] 
outside the womb, but still attached to the placenta by the 
umbilical cord”; this is simply not scientifically possible from an 
evidentiary standpoint.110 
B. Statutory and Common Law Issues:
Active/Voluntary Act vs. Passive/Involuntary Act 
1. Transfer of the Drug Is Involuntary or Passive 
Action 
Regardless of whether the Arkansas court had found a fetus 
was a person under the statute or whether there was sufficient 
evidence of an umbilical cord transfer, the state still had to deal 
with the mens rea element.  The statute under which Melissa 
Arms was convicted states that “[i]t is unlawful for any person 
to administer or cause to be ingested, inhaled, or otherwise 
introduced into the human body of another person a controlled 
substance.”111  The statute at issue does not include a mens rea 
element, and, under Arkansas law, if a statute defining an 
108. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992); see also Chan, supra note
27, at 212. 
109. See Montgomery et al., supra note 107.
110. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d 637, 642.
111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2013).
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offense does not prescribe a mental state, a culpable mental state 
is statutorily required and established if one acts purposefully, 
knowingly, or recklessly.112  There is a limitation to the mental 
state requirement if “[a] person does not commit an offense . . . 
unless his or her liability is based on conduct that includes a 
voluntary act.”113 
There is an argument that the mens rea element is met by 
one simply knowingly administering the drug:  for example, 
when Arms used the methamphetamine for her personal use.  
However, in most cases under the statute, one administers or 
causes the controlled substance to enter the victim’s body, a 
system obviously physically separate from the defendant’s 
body.114  There is a unique situation involving the requisite mens 
rea for transfers between a woman and fetus, though, because it 
is the rare situation under the statute where the two individuals 
essentially share the same body.  Therefore, this Comment 
proceeds on the assumption that a pregnant woman knowingly 
using the drug does not satisfy the mens rea component. 
Further, Melissa Arms’ criminal liability would only have 
occurred after the child was born through Arms’ transmission of 
the drugs to the child voluntarily via the umbilical cord.  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the statute “does not 
expressly criminalize the passive bodily processes that results in 
a mother’s use of a drug entering her unborn, or newborn child’s 
system,” and the statutory language “must be interpreted to refer 
to an active process.”115  As a result, it appears as if the court 
found that, despite Melissa Arms admittedly taking the 
methamphetamine voluntarily for personal use multiple times 
during her pregnancy, the transfer via the umbilical cord to her 
baby was biological and involuntary—a passive process.116 
Few courts have discussed whether a mother’s actions are 
voluntary in this type of situation.  However, as mentioned 
earlier, a Florida mother’s conviction was reversed for lack of 
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (2013).
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(a) (2013).
114. See Yates v. State, No. CACR 98-620 1999, 1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 500, at *9-
11 (Ark. Ct. App. June 30, 1999) (determining there was sufficient evidence the defendant 
introduced Rohypnol into the victim’s body).   
115. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
116. Id.
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evidence.117  Moreover, the judge said, “I can find no case where 
‘delivery’ of a drug was based on an involuntary act such as 
diffusion and blood flow.”118 
Another instance occurred when the Louisiana Court of 
Appeals held that umbilical transfer of a controlled substance 
could not be the basis for a criminal charge against the 
mother.119  The court reasoned that the “transmission of the 
drugs . . . via the umbilical cord after the child was born was not 
a voluntary act or something over which a mother giving birth 
has any control by her will.”120  Further, this does not show a 
willful act and therefore would not meet the prerequisite 
intention of criminal conduct.121  A Pennsylvania district court 
ruled similarly, stating that the attempted prosecution under a 
delivery statute required a transfer to “another person” and 
“some willful voluntary act.”122  In refusing to find a voluntary 
act, the court stated that “the inevitable, biological flow of blood 
is surely not a ‘voluntary act’ within the meaning of the 
[Pennsylvania] Code.”123 
2. Should Recklessly Apply or Does Using While
Pregnant Intend the Natural Consequences
Although there is no precedent for finding a transfer of 
drugs through the umbilical cord to a child to be voluntary or 
active criminalizing conduct, there are strong statutory 
interpretation arguments and common law interpretations 
117. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992).  The court stated that:
The expert witnesses all testified about blood flow from the umbilical cord to 
child.  But that blood flow is the child’s and the placenta through which it 
flows, is not part of the mother’s body.  No witness testified in this case that 
any cocaine derivatives passed from the mother’s womb to the placenta 
during the sixty-to-ninety seconds after the child was expelled from the birth 
canal. 
Id. 
118. Id. at 1292.
119. State v. Armstard, 991 So. 2d 116, 126-27 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
120. Id. at 124.
121. Id.
122. Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 2707 C 1991, 1992 WL 613723, at *5 (Pa. Com.
Pl. Dec. 16, 1992). 
123. Id.
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conflicting with the voluntary act exception to support the 
prosecution of women in these cases. 
As previously noted, if there is not a mens rea requirement, 
then a culpable mental state exists when one acts purposefully, 
knowingly, or recklessly.124  One acts recklessly “when the 
person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the attendant circumstances exist or the result will occur.”125 
Moreover, the risk must be the type where “disregard of the risk 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard [of] care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”126 
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that 
a person driving a truck around a curve on a bridge should be 
aware that driving on the wrong side of the road presented “a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the driver may hit an 
oncoming car from the opposite direction and kill someone in 
that car.127  Further, it was appropriate for the jury to find that 
the defendant’s failure to perceive that risk in that situation 
“constituted ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe’” in his circumstances.128 
It is arguable that Melissa Arms met the minimal 
requirement for the mens rea as defined by statute in that she 
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that introducing 
methamphetamine to her baby would occur.129  Even assuming 
that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the statute, she likely 
knew that there was a risk that the baby, after birth, would have 
the substance in his system when she used the drug one day 
before going into labor.130  Additionally, this failure to perceive 
the risk could be considered a deviation from the standard of 
care of a reasonable person.131 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has also stated that if there is 
a lack of direct evidence proving the intent or state of mind of a 
defendant that it “must usually be inferred from the 
124. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (2013).
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(3)(A) (2013).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(3)(B) (2013).
127. Utley v. State, 366 Ark. 514, 518, 237 S.W.3d 27, 30 (2006).
128. Id.
129. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4) (2013).
130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4).
131. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4)(B) (2013); Utley, 366 Ark. at 518, 237
S.W.3d at 30. 
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circumstances of the crime.”132  Moreover, “because of the 
obvious difficulty in ascertaining a defendant’s intent, a 
presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable 
consequences of his or her acts.”133 
In one Arkansas case, the court found sufficient evidence to 
support a first-degree battery conviction when the defendant 
fired a gun three times at an occupied truck.134  The court 
reasoned that because of the presumption that one “intends the 
natural and probable consequences of his acts,” the jury could 
have reasonably found that by firing at an occupied truck his 
purpose was to cause physical injury.135 
Likewise, the Arkansas delivery statute at issue in the Arms 
case falls under the criminal chapter for assault and battery.136  
Assuming that Melissa Arms’ actions were passive and fall 
under the mens rea exception, there is still an issue of whether 
her conduct of transferring the controlled substance via the 
umbilical cord is a “natural and probable consequence” of 
consuming narcotics while pregnant.  Because pregnant women 
are most likely aware that using alcohol, tobacco, or illicit drugs 
while pregnant can potentially cause harm or pass to the child, 
there appears to be a presumption that a mother using a 
controlled substance intends the natural and likely consequence 
of introducing the substance into the body of the child. 
The rationale that supports a finding that mothers who use 
drugs while pregnant cannot be convicted for transferring the 
substance to their child is primarily based on the fact that it is a 
biological, passive act.  However, this language would actually 
appear to fall under the Arkansas common law finding that a 
“natural and probable consequence”—regardless of whether it 
results from an intentional, active act or a biological, passive 
act—is sufficient to convict one for their actions.137  Clearly, 
there is a conflicting issue about which rule of law should 
prevail. 
132. Taylor v. State, 77 Ark. App. 144, 150, 72 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Ct. App. 2002).
133. Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 402, 278 S.W.3d 599, 600-01 (Ct. App.
2008). 
134. Taylor, 77 Ark. App. at 150, 72 S.W.3d at 885.
135. Id.
136. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2013).
137. Id.
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V. ARKANSAS PROPOSED SOLUTION
As previously mentioned, after Arms’ conviction was 
reversed, the Arkansas Attorney General stated that her office is 
“committed to working with the General Assembly to clarify 
that this statute makes it a crime for a pregnant woman to 
introduce controlled substances like methamphetamine into the 
body of her unborn or just born child.”138  Therefore, it seems 
that regardless of the holding in Arms v. State,139 it is highly 
likely that the Arkansas Legislature will face pressure to find a 
statutory solution in order to prosecute women for prenatal illicit 
drug use during its next session occurring in 2017.140  The 
question becomes what is the best avenue, in consideration of 
public policy arguments, to address this issue in Arkansas, as 
well as other states. 
A quick fix, such as simply defining an unborn fetus as a 
person for an introduction statute or delivery statute leaves the 
door open for interpretation and evidentiary issues.141  Further, 
the Arkansas “delivery” statute provides that one who violates it 
is guilty of a Class Y, Class B, or Class C felony.142  These types 
of harsh penalties for felony convictions are exactly what most 
who oppose prosecuting prenatal drug use fear.143 
Accordingly, the most appropriate remedy to combat this 
problem would be a specific statute that would address prenatal 
drug use directly—such as the statute Tennessee briefly 
138. See Buck, supra note 23.
139. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7-8, 471 S.W.3d 637, 642.
140. In fact, during the 2015 Arkansas legislative session, a bill was introduced to
include ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210 to the list of enumerated statutes having the term 
“unborn child” within the definition of a “person.”  See H.R. 1376, 90th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).  However, this bill “died in the House at sine die adjournment.” 
Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 11, 471 S.W.3d at 644 n.1 (Brill, C.J., concurring). 
141. See supra Part IV.
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(c)(1)-(3) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
401(a)(1) (2013) (stating that a Class Y felony sentence ranges between ten and forty 
years); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (2013) (stating that a Class B felony requires a 
five to twenty year sentence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(4) (2013) (stating that a Class 
C felony violation results in a three to ten year sentence).  Arms was convicted of a felony 
and sentenced to twenty years.  Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1, 471 S.W.3d at 639.   
143. Carlson, supra note 11, at 87-89.
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implemented.144  The proposed statute should similarly include 
an “unborn fetus” or “unborn child” in the definition of a 
“person” for a fetal assault crime.145 
This statute would not only expressly allow prenatal drug 
use to be prosecuted as an assault146 but would also give states 
the option to classify the offense as a lesser misdemeanor.147  For 
example, if Arkansas adopted a punishment for either a Class A 
or Class B misdemeanor, the maximum sentence would be one 
year or ninety-days, respectively.148  By allowing a lesser 
misdemeanor penalty—a compromise of sorts— those in favor 
of prosecuting for prenatal drug-use would retain a criminal 
punishment for the offense, while those who oppose a severe 
punishment would likely appreciate that the maximum sentence 
would be reduced to no more than a year. 
In addition to a less steep penalty for violating the proposed 
statute, an affirmative defense should also remain; specifically, 
participation in a drug-treatment program.149  However, while 
this affirmative defense in Tennessee is a good foundation, 
technically a woman in Tennessee can take a risk and enroll the 
day before expecting to give birth, then complete the program 
without punishment because the statute only requires one enter a 
program prior to the child’s birth.150  The proposed statute 
should include a strict time frame during which the expectant 
mother would be required to enter a drug rehabilitation program.  
This time frame ideally will ease the medical field’s strong 
belief that prosecuting women is detrimental to the women, the 
baby, and society because it deters women from seeking help 
and avoiding punishment.  This option would give women a 
period of time in which they know, regardless of their struggles 
with addiction, they can openly reach out for assistance without 
the fear of prosecution.  The time frame for entrance into the 
program would also help protect the fetus—a key issue for 
144. See supra Part III.C.
145. See supra Part III.C.
146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (West 2014).  This statute was amended
in 2016.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (West 2016). 
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(b)(1)(A) (West 2016) (stating that typically
assault is a Class A misdemeanor, but extreme cases allow for a Class B misdemeanor). 
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(b)(1)-(2) (2013).
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (West 2014).
150. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3).
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prosecutors and the state—by encouraging expectant mothers to 
enroll early so as to meet the bright-line rule which would allow 
them to avoid prosecution.  As previously discussed, the 
different methods in which states have attempted to combat the 
increasing use of illicit drugs by pregnant women has revealed 
the sharply divided societal opinions on the issue and has 
created questionable prosecutorial legal arguments.  A specific 
statute could, in theory, create a compromise between the 
opposing sides of the argument about whether to prosecute 
women for prenatal drug use, while providing an opportunity for 
soon-to-be mothers and children to live healthy lives. 
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the current Arkansas statutory language and 
case law, even though a fetus is not a person under the 
introduction of a controlled substance statute, the presumed 
intention of an action’s “natural and probable consequences” 
allows pregnant women using drugs to be prosecuted under the 
statute.151  Therefore, a mother who knowingly or intentionally 
ingests a controlled substance and is aware that through the 
natural, biological process of exchanging fluid through the 
placenta with her unborn fetus, should be presumed to intend the 
natural and probable consequence of transmitting the drug to the 
child in utero.  This reasoning follows the thought process of the 
Whitner court in that “it is common knowledge that use of 
cocaine during pregnancy can harm the viable unborn child.”152 
Further, just as Alabama and Tennessee have statutory 
public policy in favor of protecting both unborn and born 
children,153 “Arkansas public policy ‘is to protect the life of 
every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent 
permitted by the Federal Constitution.’”154  Accordingly, 
determining that one who ingests a controlled substance while 
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(a) (2013); Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400,
403, 278 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ct. App. 2008). 
152. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785 (S.C. 1997).
153. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (citing ALA.
CODE § 26-22-1(a) (1975)); In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009). 
154. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 11, 471 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Brill, C.J.,
concurring) (citing ARK. CONST. amend. LXVIII, § 2). 
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pregnant intends the natural and probable consequences of their 
action is supported by Arkansas public policy as defined in the 
Arkansas Constitution.  This does not mean, however, that 
prosecuting women under the theory of introduction of a 
controlled substance to another person is the correct legal 
theory. 
The more appropriate and less controversial attempt to 
curve prenatal drug use, while not deterring women from 
seeking medical attention or addiction assistance while pregnant, 
is to enact a statute specifically criminalizing prenatal drug use 
and fetal assault, while allowing women to avoid prosecution if 
enrolled in a drug treatment program.  In this proposed statute, 
both those for and against the prosecution of women for prenatal 
drug use will make concessions to the other side, hopefully 
allowing some form of middle ground to be formed to help 
address this growing issue for the sake of maternal health, 
neonatal and infant health, as well as society as a whole.155 
KYLE KENNEDY
155. See supra Part V.
